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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This matter having been transferred from the Supreme Court, the
Court has jurisdiction to review the final judgment of the district court under
Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(j).

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did Appellant Shayne E. Todd adequately challenge any of the

grounds upon which the district court granted summary judgment to the
Appellee Utah Board of Pardons and Parole?
2.

Does Mr. Todd present any argument on appeal that is not

squarely foreclosed by controlling precedent and/or the appellate record?

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Any determinative provisions are provided in the text of the brief.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case: In essence, Mr. Todd challenges the Board of
Pardons and Parole's decision in 2001 and again in 2010 to schedule his next
parole hearing in 2029, and the Board's role in parole decisions generally.
Proceedings below: Several years after the Board set Mr. Todd's parole
hearing date, he filed a petition for extraordinary relief in district court.
Record (R.) 1-18. In relevant part, the Board moved for summary judgment
and Mr. Todd responded (among numerous other filings). R. 320-422, 808840.
Disposition: The trial court granted the Board summary judgment on
the grounds that Mr. Todd's arguments already had been rejected in one of
his prior appeals and/or by prior controlling decisions upholding the Board's
authority to set parole within Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme. R.
1279-84.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Todd was serving a prison sentence for robbery, not set to expire
until 2009, when the Board paroled him in 1999. R. 401, 605-06. As a
condition of parole, Mr. Todd agreed to obey the law and not possess any
firearms. R. 402.
But within two weeks of being paroled, he shot his estranged wife point
blank in the head as she clung to the driver-side door of an SUV he was
2

driving through a parking lot. State v. Todd, 2007 UT App 349, 11 5, 36-40,
173 P.3d 170; R. 608, 636-37. The State subsequently charged him with
murder and possession of a dangerous weapon. R. 337. Mr. Todd pied guilty
to the weapons charge and a jury found him guilty of murder. R. 358, 374.
Shortly before sentencing, Adult Probation and Parole completed a
sentencing matrix form suggesting that Mr. Todd be imprisoned for 26.5
years based on Utah's sentencing guidelines. R. 691. 1 But considering all
relevant factors, the trial court sentenced Mr. Todd to two prison terms: five
years to life for murder and one to fifteen years for weapons possession. R.
376, 397, 638-39. The court ordered the sentences for both crimes to run
y;j

consecutively to each other and to any other prior sentences Mr. Todd was
already serving. Id. Consequently, the murder and weapons sentences
would not begin until after his robbery sentence expired in 2009. See, e.g., R.
405.
Soon after the sentencing, the Board held a parole revocation hearing,
attended by Mr. Todd and his counsel, in April 2001. R. 405, 646, 649. Mr.
Todd acknowledged receiving the Board's disclosure file prior to the hearing.
R. 651. Adult Probation and Parole recommended that Mr. Todd's parole

The matrix form doesn't reveal who completed it but this Court previously
stated that Adult Probation and Parole prepared the sentencing report
estimating Mr. Todd would serve 26.5 years in prison. State v. Todd, 2013
UT App 231, 1 3, 312 P.3d 936.
1

3

(from the robbery sentence) be revoked and that he never be paroled again.
R. 65 7. After the hearing, the Board revoked his parole from the robbery
sentence and noted that his weapons sentence would not expire until 2024
(fifteen years after his robbery sentence expired) and that his murder
sentence was life. R. 405. The Board set the next parole hearing for 2029
and provided Mr. Todd a rationale sheet indicating the aggravating and
mitigating factors behind its decision. R. 406. 2
Mr. Todd then challenged his murder conviction and sentence in the
appellate courts. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed his murder conviction
"in light of the overwhelming evidence of [his] guilt." Todd, 2007 UT App
349,

,r 51.

The Court later affirmed the denial of any post-conviction relief.

Todd v. State, 2011 UT App 313, 262 P.3d 1222.
In the meantime. Mr. Todd also tried to persuade the Board to hold his
next parole hearing sooner than 2029. He wrote letters to the Board in 2003
and 2004. R. 675-77, 678-83. He apparently also asked the prison's Offender
Management Team (OMR) in 2010 to submit to the Board information
supporting an earlier parole hearing date based on his conduct in prison. R.
408, 413. OMR's subsequent report made a referral to the Board for an
The Director of the Bureau of Planning and Research at the Department of
Corrections advised Mr. Todd in 2003 that convicted murderers are rarely released
from prison and that it was "highly likely you will never be released from prison,
since your most serious offense is a 'life' top, and the court has ordered consecutive
terms for your convicted offenses." R. 583.

2
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earlier hearing date while noting that the time matrix for Mr. Todd's
sentences was "300 months" not including the robbery sentence. R. 413.
In late 2010, the Board reviewed OMR's report and declined to change
_.,;

the parole hearing date from 2029. R. 416. The Board's order then listed Mr.
Todd's relevant crimes and sentences along with their respective expiration
dates: (1) robbery, a "1-15" year sentence that expired on June 9, 2009; (2)
murder, a "5-100" year sentence set to expire on May 28, 2107; and (3)
weapons possession, a "1-15" year sentence set to expire on May 13, 2120. 3 R.
416, 695.
Mr. Todd initially challenged the Board's decision by filing a motion to
correct an illegal sentence under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e).

State v. Todd, 2013 UT App 231,

11 1-3, 312 P.3d 936.

He argued the Board

had modified his life sentence, improperly set a definite term on his
indeterminate sentence, and violated due process by setting a parole date
beyond the sentence recommended by the Guidelines. Id.

115-8.

This Court

rejected his arguments on the merits or as not properly raised. Id.
Undeterred, Mr. Todd appears to have repeated or repackaged the
same basic arguments into a petition for extraordinary relief challenging the
Board's decision to keep his parole hearing date in 2029. The Board moved
The Board initially issued an order with incorrect expirations dates for Mr. Todd's
sentences but fixed the mistake by issuing another order with corrected dates. R.
693-95.
3

5

for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Mr. Todd timely
filed this appeal. R. 1312.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Mr. Todd challenges the Board's decision setting his parole hearing for
2029. The district court granted summary judgment against him because his
claims are barred by issue preclusion and by controlling precedent. The
district court also refused to address a due process argument that Mr. Todd
had not timely raised. As the Appellant, he bears the burden to offer facts
and law showing how the district court erred. But Mr. Todd never appears to
do so. The Court can affirm on this ground alone.
Aside from this threshold problem, Mr. Todd's various arguments on
appeal fail for one or more reasons. First, Utah appellate courts have
repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the State's indeterminate
sentencing system and the Board's authority to determine actual time served.
Second, Mr. Todd has no liberty interest in the sentencing guidelines, nor has
the Board deprived him of any alleged interest in being released from prison
within the guidelines' recommendations. Third, the Board's rationale sheet
adequately explains its decision. Fourth, there are no legal or factual
grounds for this Court to review the Board's internal operating procedures
about which Mr. Todd complains.

6

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment for
correctness. Olsen v. Fair Co., 2016 UT App 46, 16,369 P.3d 473; Wellborn

v. Bd. of Pardons and Parole, 2010 UT App 230, para. 3 (per curiam)
(unpublished).
The Board's decisions are generally not subject to judicial review. Utah
Code § 77-27-5(3). But it is nonetheless well established that courts may use
an extraordinary writ to review the Board's decisions in two narrow
circumstances: to correct "a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion," Renn v.

Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995), and to assure that
J

procedural due process was not denied, Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons,
870 P.2d 902, 909-13 (Utah 1993). Importantly, judicial review addresses
only "the fairness of the process by which the Board undertakes its

J

...)

sentencing function," not the result. Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons &

Parole, 947 P.2d 664, 667 (Utah 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Board has exclusive authority to determine the actual number of years a
defendant serves, Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah 1994), and the
court does not "sit as a panel of review on the result, absent some other
constitutional claim." Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945, 947
(Utah 1994).

7

While courts afford prose appellants like Mr. Todd every reasonable
consideration, they are still held to the same standard as any qualified
member of the bar and must present coherent arguments supported by the
record and the law. State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4,

,r 19, 128 P.3d 1171; Utah

R. App. P. 24(a)(9). This is particularly appropriate for an experienced pro se
litigant like Mr. Todd. See, e.g., Todd v. Sorenson, 2015 UT App 87, 348 P.3d
350 (Mr. Todd representing himself); Todd, 2011 UT App 313 (Mr. Todd
representing himself).

ARGUMENT
Although Mr. Todd's arguments are sometimes difficult to follow, his
overarching complaint remains clear-he's mad the Board won't hold his
parole hearing until 2029. So he challenges the Board authority to determine
release dates. He argues the Board should be bound by the sentencing
guidelines. He questions the rationales behind the Board's decision. And he
asserts the Board's internal operating procedures are deficient.
But for all his briefing, he never really explains why the district court's
specific holdings are wrong. And his arguments are contrary to binding
precedent and the record. The district court's decision should be affirmed.
Mr. Todd presents no valid reason to overturn that judgment, much less any
reason to reject controlling case law.

8

I.

Mr. Todd Fails To Show How The District Court Erred
The district court granted summary judgment against Mr. Todd for two

reasons: his arguments are barred by (1) issue preclusion and/or (2) existing
case law. Order at 2-5; R. 1280-83. The court also determined that Mr. Todd
failed to properly raise a procedural due process issue. Order at 4 n.4; R.
1282 n.4. The Court should deny Mr. Todd any appellate relief because he
never explains how the district court erred in its determinations.
First, the district court correctly held that Mr. Todd's arguments were
the same ones that this Court already adjudicated and rejected in a prior
appeal affirming the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. Order
..,;

at 2-3; R. 1280-81 (citing Todd, 2013 UT App 231,

,r,r 7-8).

Accordingly, the

court held the arguments were barred by issue preclusion. Id. While Mr.
Todd's brief discusses some general issue preclusion principles, Aplt's Br. at
11-13, he never explains-as far as Appellee can tell-how the district court
misapplied the doctrine to his arguments (e.g., showing the specific issues he
preserved below that were not already adjudicated in his prior appeal
addressing his motion to correct illegal sentence). If anything, Mr. Todd's
brief confirms the district court's conclusion that his arguments retread the
same old ground. He not only asks this Court to reverse its opinion from his
prior appeal, Aplt's Br. at 11 (which is only necessary because he's pressing
the same arguments), but also claims that his petition "asserts a good case
9

[of] illegal prison sentence," Aplt's Br. at 14, the very relief he unsuccessfully
sought in his prior appeal. See, e.g., Todd, 2013 UT App 231, , , 3-4.
Second, the district court also correctly concluded that Mr. Todd's
complaints about the indeterminate sentencing system and the reviewability
of Board decisions were "the same arguments he has made before" and had
already been rejected by controlling precedents. Order at 4: R. 1282 (citing
cases rejecting Mr. Todd's arguments). Again, Mr. Todd does not explain how
the district court erred in so holding. Just as he did below, Mr. Todd "fails to
demonstrate that the Board of Pardons took any action that has not been
approved by the legislator drafters of the challenged statutes, or that has not
been discussed in the case law that came before him." Order at 5; R. 1283.
Finally, the district court properly declined to address Mr. Todd's due
process claims (that he didn't receive all the documents the Board relied on at
his parole hearing and that he couldn't speak at the hearing) because he
failed to raise them until his summary judgment response. Order at 4 n.4, 5
n.5; R. 1282 n.4, 1283 n.5. As far as Appellee can tell, Mr. Todd never
explains how the district court's ruling on this issue was wrong, much less
shows (via citations to the record or underlying pleadings) that he timely
raised this issue for the court's consideration. Instead, he baldly reasserts his
due process argument on appeal (in a section that merely mentions "plain
error"). Aplt's Br. at 1, 4, 28-29. But he doesn't explain how plain error
10

~-

possibly helps him here, nor how his argument survives the uncontested fact
that he and his attorney had notice of the hearing and he acknowledged
receiving the Board's disclosure file beforehand. R. 648-51.
As the appellant, Mr. Todd had the burden to argue facts and law
showing the district court's holdings were wrong. See, e.g., Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9). He hasn't met this burden. The district court can be affirmed on
this ground alone.

II.

Mr. Todd's Arguments Are Contrary To The Law And Facts

Aside from Mr. Todd's failure to adequately challenge the district
court's conclusions, all of his arguments on appeal are contradicted by settled
law and/or the record facts. His various assertions and complaints boil down
to four basic arguments: (1) the indeterminate sentencing system and the
Board's authority to determine actual time served are incompatible or
··..d

unconstitutional, (2) the sentencing guidelines limit the Board's authority to
set parole hearings, (3) the Board didn't sufficiently justify its decision, and
(4) the Board's internal operating procedures are inadequate. None of these
arguments withstand scrutiny.
A.

The indeterminate sentencing system and the Board's
parole authority are constitutional.

Mr. Todd makes various arguments attacking the State's
indeterminate sentencing system and/or the Board's almost unreviewable

11

authority to determine how long the prisoner actually serves within the
sentenced range. See, e.g., Aplt's Br. at 12-13, 31-32. But, as the district
court noted, the relevant statutes and Utah's sentencing/parole system have
been repeatedly upheld by Utah courts. Order at 4; R. 1282 (citing State v.

Telford, 2002 UT 51, 48 P.3d 228; Padilla v. Bd. of Pardons, 947 P.2d 664
(Utah 1997); Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508 (Utah 1994); Foote v. Bd. of

Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991); Jones v. Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 2009
UT App 142, *1 (per curiam) (unpublished)). Mr. Todd neither explains why
these precedents do not control here nor offers any novel, coherent theories
undermining the current system's constitutionality.

B.

The sentencing guidelines are not binding nor implicated
here

Most of Mr. Todd's arguments revolve around the unfounded notion
that the sentencing guidelines-and their recommendation that he serve 26.5
years in prison-created a liberty interest of which he was deprived by the
Board's decision to schedule his next parole hearing in 2029. See, e.g., Br. at
6-9, 24, 33. There are two major flaws with this argument.
First, the Supreme Court has already rejected "the concept that the
Guidelines create a liberty interest or an 'expectation of release."' Monson v.

Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Utah 1996); see also Preece, 886 P.2d at 511
("The state sentencing guidelines used by the board of pardons do not have

12

the force and effect of law. Consequently, any 'expectation of release' derived
from the guidelines is at best tenuous." (internal citation omitted)).
Moreover, the sentencing matrix form states explicitly that "[t]hese are
...J

guidelines only. They do not create any right or expectation on behalf of the
offender." R. 691.
Second, even if the guidelines somehow created a liberty interest, that
interest wasn't deprived by the Board. The 26.5 year estimate applied only to
Mr. Todd's murder and weapons sentences. R. 691. The district court
ordered those sentences to run consecutive to any other sentences Mr. Todd
was serving. R. 376, 397, 638-39. Because he was already serving a robbery

...J

sentence, the murder and weapons sentence did not even commence until mid
2009. See, e.g., R. 405, 416. Thus, even if the guidelines' 26.5 year estimate
was binding, the earliest Mr. Todd could have expected to be released was
late 2035. The Board's decision to set his parole hearing six years earlier, in
2029, does not in any way deprive him of that purported expectation.
All of Mr. Todd's guidelines-related arguments fail on the law and the
facts.

C.

The Board's rationale sheet adequately explains its
reasoning

Mr. Todd also argues that the Board's rationale sheet doesn't help him
understand why the Board set his next hearing in 2029. Aplt's Br. at 23, 29-

13

30. But whatever complaints he has about the Board's explanation, the
Supreme Court held that "the rationale sheets used by the Board to explain
its parole decision [are] adequate" and satisfy due process. Padilla, 947 P.2d
at 670. Mr. Todd has not cited any contrary authority or explained why that
precedent does not apply to the rationale sheet in this case.
D.

There is no reason to review the Board's internal
operating procedures.

Mr. Todd spends several pages complaining about the Board's alleged
internal operating procedures-the fallibility of case analysts, lack of quality
control systems, record keeping, etc. Aplt's Br. at 20-23, 33. 4 But these
arguments aren't relevant. The Court, as noted, can review the board's
decision only to ensure due process and rectify flagrant abuses of discretion.
Mr. Todd waived any argument that his parole hearing lacked minimum due
process, nor does the record support such an argument. Moreover, he
presents no valid argument that the Board has somehow abused its
discretion. Indeed, "so long as the period of incarceration decided upon by the
board of pardons falls within an inmate's applicable indeterminate range,
e.g., five years to life, then that decision, absent unusual circumstances,
cannot be arbitrary and capricious." Preece, 886 P.2d at 512. That is
precisely what happened here.
The district court did not address this argument and it's not clear that Mr.
Todd preserved it below. The Board nonetheless addresses it on appeal.

4
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The Board's internal operating procedures are not "unusual
circumstances" justifying review by this Court or requiring the Board to
grant an earlier parole hearing.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the district court's
decision granting summary judgment to the Board and dismissing Mr. Todd's
Petition for Extraodinary Relief.

Respectfully submitted,

Stanford E. urser (13440)
Deputy Solicitor General
Amanda N. Montague (9941)
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140858
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
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